

16 Towards a theory of grievance-based mobilisation

For the last decades, research on politico-ideological violence has been dominated by the studies that focus on jihadist terrorism (Schuurman, 2020), under the label of the so-called terrorism studies (Jackson, 2012). The field has been dominated by three major biases: First, it is a field that is built on expertise developed in Europe and North America that deals predominantly with regions and subjects that are Non-White and Non-European. This Western-centrism of academic research has been pointed out as problematic and is particularly relevant for the study of terrorism and political violence, because it supports existing orientalist stereotypes about the dangerous Black and Brown Other (Kundnani, 2014; Mohamedou, 2018; Mockaitis, 2003; Silva, 2018). Another important bias is the state-centrism of research on this phenomenon, since knowledge production is closely entangled with state departments, intelligence services and law enforcement (Ahmed, 2020; Jackson, 2012; Kundnani, 2014; Silva, 2018). The state-centrist bias makes it difficult to grasp the phenomenon in a holistic manner, given that the state is by essence reticent to acknowledge harms committed by the state. Finally, the field is also characterised by a tendency to depoliticise the phenomenon by emphasising individualistic and cultural-psychological motives for violence over political and structural factors (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010; Lafaye & Rapin, 2017; Mohamedou, 2018). At least partly due to these major biases, grievances have been sidelined in the debate and research on politico-ideological violence since 9/11 (Ajil, 2022). This has obscured what is at the core of political violence, whether religiously inspired or not, namely a profound dissatisfaction with a status quo that produces pain and suffering.

This book sought to respond to that lacuna by investigating the notion of grievances and their importance for various forms of mobilisation and political engagement for causes and conflicts in the Arab World. Through a focus on grievances, a larger debate could become possible and jihadist violence could be demystified. Also, by focusing on conflicts and causes in the Arab World, the study covers the various forms of Salafi-jihadist mobilisation which have been the focus of the field, while at the same time avoiding an exclusive and exceptionalising focus by widening the sample to include various ideological strands and influences.

In the article *Politico-ideological violence: Zooming in on grievances* (Ajil, 2022) I argued that a focus on grievances provides an alternative to voyeuristic

approaches that focus predominantly on the violence itself, as well as on the politicised and therefore somewhat constrained lens of academic research on this phenomenon. Also, a focus on grievances allows for an investigation of socio-structural dimensions based on the perspectives of those involved, thereby providing a perspective ‘from below’. It is, therefore, better suited to understand why and how actors themselves understand their acts as defensive and reactive. Grievances being universal to human beings around the world, such an approach allows also for a transversal study of political violence across different ideological orientations. Finally, taking grievances into account allows for a more holistic perspective on the phenomenon in the sense that it considers the ways in which efforts to tackle terrorism may themselves breed new grievances and violence.

To study grievances, this book has drawn on an innovative research method. The data collection consisted mainly of first-hand face-to-face interviews. Although the state of research has significantly improved over recent years, first-hand data collection continues to be rare when it comes to terrorism and political violence (Horgan, 2012; Silke & Schmidt-Petersen, 2017; Schuurman, 2020). Interviews were conducted over a period of two years in Lebanon, Switzerland and Canada. They covered a novel combination of research subjects, which include individuals who are or were politically engaged for causes related to the Arab World using mainly non-violent means (PIM) as well as individuals who resorted to violence or joined groups that used violent tactics (PIV), allowing for the comparison of violent with non-violent activists (Dornschneider, 2021; Obaidi et al., 2020). The sample allows for contrasting and comparing the views of people who hold similar grievances related to the Arab World but choose different ways to act upon them, in three different regions of the world.

In addition to these two core groups of interviewees, a third group consisted of peripheral actors including practitioners, policymakers, researchers, members of the community and families and friends of those engaged. Given the sensitivity of the research topic as well as the hard-to-reach nature of the research population, these interviewees provided valuable insights into the phenomenon.

The transversal analysis of the narratives collected in this specific design across Lebanon, Switzerland and Canada can be taken to a level of abstraction that speaks to the phenomenon more generally. While some of this abstraction has taken place in the discussion of the findings already, the formulation of the overarching theory presents an additional layer of integration and abstraction, in line with the precepts of Grounded Theory. The theory of politico-ideological mobilisation and violence that is presented here posits three major *social performances* through which grievances become linked to mobilisation, namely identification, appropriation and responsabilisation (see Figure 16.1). These can be read as *social performances* because grievances are the result of an iterative collective social co-construction. At the core of these social performances is an injustice, that is *named, owned* and sought to be *addressed*.

The three social performances highlight the complexity of the relationship between grievances and injustices: Grievances are long-term emotional and cognitive states of disillusionment, disenfranchisement and frustration with a particular




Figure 16.1 Three social performances in relation to grievances

situation that is considered unjust. For grievances to form and be acted upon, the three social performances are therefore central in crystallising an injustice and making it the core object of grievances.

Identifying injustices is an individual and collective process of sense-making of present and past witnessing and experiencing suffering and pain in the form of structural inequality and neglect or recurring aggression and oppression. Grievances are feelings that form over a long period and denote both attitudinal and emotional opposition to dysfunctionality and the entities seen as responsible for them. The findings confirm the importance of moral shocks (Crettiez, 2016; Jasper, 2011) and collective memories (Paez & Liu, 2011) of pain and suffering for the identification of injustices and therefore the grievance formation process. The instances of confrontation with extreme suffering via moral shocks provide a sort of empirical evidence and proof that illustrate the *raison d'être* of grievances. While grievances are a more complex and long-term feeling, they frequently refer to instances of extreme violence and moral indignation that are much more short-term in nature. Collective memory consisting of stories and episodes of pain and suffering informs a collective identity that revolves principally around the common suffering of members of a perceived collective. This idea resonates with Huët's (2015) reflections on the centrality of suffering for collective violent engagement, Paez et al.'s (2008) observation that the remembering of WWII is linked to increased willingness to participate in fighting among a Western sample, and with Pollak's (1993) suggestion that individuals tap into collective memories to construct their own identity and find coherent explanations for their own story and suffering.

Since grievances are the results of a collective process of social construction, *grievance entrepreneurs* can play a crucial role therein, by mobilising collective memory and narratives in the present to provoke moral shocks about a chosen

situation. Grievance entrepreneurs may act consciously and aim at mobilising individuals and groups emotionally and behaviourally. In this sense, grievance entrepreneurs combine the concepts of the *memory entrepreneur* (Pollak, 1993) and the *moral entrepreneur* (Becker, 1963; Lakhani, 2014). Through their conscious manufacturing of and recourse to moral shocks, they can be seen as contributing to *moral panic* in the sense proposed by Cohen (1972) – not as traditional leaders but as ‘charismatic leaders’ in the Weberian sense, as suggested by Jooisse (2018). They may also act less consciously, by denouncing and highlighting what they see as injustice and thereby exposing others to them. Grievance entrepreneurs are usually individuals with a certain authority derived from their age, experience, engagement or status or individuals in the immediate environment such as friends or family members. Importantly, individuals who themselves are exposed to moral shocks can become grievance entrepreneurs themselves if they choose to highlight them and expose others to them.

Whether individuals are not only exposed but also receptive to moral shocks and likely to develop grievances is related to their sensitivity to social and political issues. It has been argued before that those who engage in political violence are particularly sensitive to injustice (Cohen, 2016; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). To a certain extent, this has been found to be true in this study as well. However, the sensitivity to injustice can be significantly nuanced. It is not a sort of hyper-sensitivity that characterises individuals who mobilise, but a cognitive and emotional stance that can be described as an intentional and enduring *resistance against apathy*. Individuals make a conscious and recurring choice to look at injustice and to care about it, in a political sense reminiscent of the *ethics of care* (Gilligan, 1977). *They choose to see, and they choose to care*. Two main emotional moments are associated with the identification of injustices. One extraordinarily consistent one is a feeling of *betrayal*: Learning about an injustice means realising that the things one has believed so far – including the actors one has learned to trust – turn out to be a fallacy. This moment of betrayal includes a rupture from hegemonic narratives (Gramsci, 1971) about how the world works, including, importantly, the axiomatic legitimacy attributed to states and state actors. These moments of betrayal generally provoke strong negative emotions. More positive emotions accompany the second emotional moment, namely *epiphany*, which signifies the eye-opening that comes with that painful realisation, the feeling of being able to see behind the curtains, understand the true injustices that exist in the world and that most of the world simply glosses over day in day out. Both the negative feeling of betrayal and the positive feelings of epiphany can contribute to connecting an individual with a community of like-minded individuals who share these feelings and engage upon them.

To understand the *identification of injustice* and therefore one of the initial performances of grievances, it is crucial to get a grasp of the different types of grievances and their characteristics. Despite their variety and multifaceted nature, which has been laid out above, grievances can almost all be brought back to dysfunctions associated with states and the international community of states. The socio-economic grievances or ethno-racial grievances that have been

identified are linked to political grievances, which, in one way or another are linked to dysfunctionalities that are attributable to the state: The traditional purveyor of safety and security that holds the monopoly on violence. These dysfunctionalities include *hierarchisations* enacted by the state, where some lives are valued over others and treated less favourably; *hypocrisy* of the state, which engages in violence or causes social harms while benefitting from the veil of legitimacy, or connives over the wrongdoings of other states; and the *tyranny* of the state itself, which attacks and violates the rights of its own citizens or innocent human beings. All three dysfunctionalities can be found in the way states have engaged in the Global War on Terror, whether themselves, or as a collective of states (see Figure 16.2). The post-9/11 era and the infringement on civil liberties that ensued has produced grievances across the world, which contributed in many ways to the terroristic violence we are grappling with today and certainly in the years to come.

Grievances have a certain number of characteristics that seem to facilitate their persistence across time and their spread across space. Grievances are *historic* in the sense that they connect injustices in the present to injustices in the past. They refer to *large-scale* suffering affecting many people *across borders*, and they are oriented towards the *collective*. Grievances refer predominantly to the suffering of the *weak and the poor*. The injustice is *flagrant* in the sense that a more powerful entity is oppressing a much less powerful one, and, importantly, the injustice remains *unpunished*.

Taken together, these characteristics appear to be both products and ingredients of *three major transformations* that seem to make certain situations or events become encapsulated by grievances lasting across time and space. The first one is *collectivisation*, i.e., understanding and presenting the grievance as affecting a large, even global community and disconnecting it to a certain extent




Figure 16.2 Major dysfunctionalities of states in the GWOT as main sources of grievances

from individual suffering; *glocalisation*, i.e., connecting between local and global situations, thereby establishing a narrative of continuity *across space*; and *historicisation*, i.e., connecting present situations to the past, by using fragmentary evidence of past suffering in order to build a narrative of continuity *across time*. The fact that activists resort to narratives of continuity has also been identified by Bosi and Della Porta (2012). These three transformations all serve one major objective which is *decomplexification*: For grievances to emerge, form, consolidate, spread and maintain themselves as valid pieces of analysis, at least from the point of view of those who hold them, they need to refer to a clear situation of flagrant and grave injustice. Perpetrators and victims need to be clearly established. The decomplexification lends *clarity* and *gravity* to narratives on grievances, which are essential to their existence and their survival. While the connection between locally oriented and globally oriented grievances has been pointed out before (Akbarzadeh & Mansouri, 2010; Geisser et al., 2017; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Kundnani, 2014; Mohamedou, 2018), the role that glocalisation plays specifically, on a narrative level, by decomplexifying reality in order to make grievances palpable and shareable, is a novel finding (see Figure 16.3.).

Besides being named and identified, injustices also need to be *owned* and therefore undergo a form of appropriation to gain relevance at the personal level. Individuals appropriate injustices for themselves, that is, conclude that they affect them or may do so, even if they may not directly impact their lives at the beginning of their engagement. Individuals come to appropriate an injustice often because of their cultural, ethnic or linguistic heritage or the environment in which they grow up, which connects them to a collective identity. The role of collective identity in politico-ideological mobilisation and violence has been amply explored by the literature (Anderson, 1983; Ferguson & McAuley, 2020; Mansbridge & Morris, 2001; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Jenkins, 2004; Ruggiero, 2005; Rydgren, 2007). What the findings of the present study may add to this literature is perhaps the




Figure 16.3 Transformations of grievances that serve decomplexification

way collective identities are adopted, namely not only through positive socialisation, but also through negative: The experience of othering and otherness, as well as deep societal cleavages that run along ethnic, cultural, religious or political lines, *force* individuals into collective identities, to feel tolerated and accepted for who they are. An aspect that has been present in the literature on jihadist forms of violent mobilisation is the notion of victimhood, notably the feeling that a global Islamic community is under siege (Abi-Hashem, 2004; Abu Rumman, 2014; Uehling, 2004; Lakhani, 2014; McCauley, 2018; Reidy, 2018). To a certain extent, this has been found to be relevant in this study as well but may be better understood and demystified via the notion of *madhloumiya*, namely a sense of transnational even global victimhood that is the result of systematic persecution and oppression of a particular group. It is relevant to all groups and ideological orientations, and therefore far from being anyhow specific to the idea of an Islamic *madhloumiya*, which is also grossly simplistic given that different forms of Islamic *madhloumiya* are often competing against each other, e.g., Sunni *madhloumiya* and Shii *madhloumiya*. *Madhloumiya* is a major attribute of the collective identity that plays a role in grievance-based engagement: Individuals associate themselves with a collective of *suffering*.

Apart from a collective identity that is mediated by ethnic, religious or cultural affiliations, appropriation also needs to be understood as a result of the rupture that is operated through the identification of injustice and the feelings of betrayal. When the radicalisation literature discusses breaks and ruptures, it usually refers to the fact that individuals who radicalise and turn to violence sever their ties to existing social circles or conventional norms (Akers & Silverman, 2014; Crettiez, 2016; Doosje et al., 2016; El-Said & Barrett, 2017). The importance of a rupture in this sense can, of course, not be understated. However, it is another rupture that is underlying this rather technical or logistical one, namely one of cognitive nature. Individuals who are confronted with major injustices through moral shocks experience a moment where their entire worldview is profoundly shaken and dismantled. In those moments, they operate a break from a hegemonic narrative that they have grown up to believe in. Hegemony is here understood in the sense proposed by Gramsci (1971), as an ideology and a narrative of ‘common sense’ that is propagated in a given society and serves to maintain a status quo. From the moment of their rupture, individuals radicalise in the sense that they enter a constant struggle against that hegemonic narrative that relentlessly delegitimises and criminalises what it considers as radicality. They adopt an identity which conforms to that positionality, which can be aptly described as one of *rebellious underdogs*. The importance of resistance and rebellious identities as well as the idea of the underdog have been discussed in the literature (Crettiez, 2011; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Hamm, 2007; Liebling & Williams, 2018; Liebling et al., 2011; Mansbridge & Morris, 2001). The collective identity that individuals tap into refers to a collective of the oppressed, which are struggling against a more powerful oppressive entity. This imagined community (Anderson, 1983) has the advantage of transcending ethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic attributes, and is therefore much more accessible. The rebellious underdog is an ideal figure

that is unjustly suffering but refuses to simply endure the suffering and stands up to fight against injustice and for justice. This tale-like imaginary makes it a very attractive and empowering figure. Rebelliousness through self-perception of being the underdog can therefore become a reason for radicality for its own sake. Importantly, the underdog identity can persist even throughout the comeback of the group and inform *post-hoc* justifications for the group's existence or privilege to retain arms, as continues to be the case for Hezbollah, for example (see also Childs, 2011; Norton, 2007).

Finally, two major feelings accompany the appropriation of injustice, namely guilt and solidarity. On the one hand, guilt has been dealt with in the social movement literature (Jasper, 2011), but has barely been put forward as an analytical category within research on political violence. Identifying with the suffering of others provokes strong feelings of guilt about one's privilege and relative safety. This feeling of guilt is played on in mobilisation and in recruitment for various causes. Experiences and moments of solidarity, on the other hand, work to solidify the bonds between those who engage for certain causes and any potential allies. This feeling is strongly associated with the collective identity of suffering and thereby comes to mean solidarity in the face of enmity and oppression. It is therefore a specific form of solidarity that is closely tied to the self-perception of rebelliously struggling against an oppressive force. Solidarity occupies a prominent role in the narratives on politico-ideological engagement, since it is evocative of a spirit of collectivism, of caring about a larger community, that defines itself against individualist isolationism. In that sense, it resembles Ibn Khaldun's notion of *asabiyya* (Ahmed, 2005).

Identification and appropriation of injustice lay the foundation for a process of responsabilisation, which constitutes the major link between grievances and action, whether violent or non-violent. After identifying the injustice and widely agreeing that the status quo is wrong and untenable, the question of what should and can be done to redress the injustice or punish the perpetrators is naturally prompted. At this point, two major elements play a determinant role. One of them is awareness of the limits of non-violent democratic means to enact political change. In line with legal cynicism (Kirk & Papachristos, 2011; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998) and estrangement (Bell, 2017) that result from learning about and witnessing or even experiencing the ways in which legitimate and conventional actors can cause harm and suffering, there is a certain cynicism about the false promise of democracy. By essence, democratic means have a limited capacity to promote and effect subversive and radical changes to the status quo. The process is usually tedious and the result is often far from ideal. Subversive and radical agendas bear in themselves the promise of precisely this change and respond to what we shall call a *desire for radicality*. The second element is the existence of a *revolutionary void*, namely the perception that nobody is doing anything against this injustice. The revolutionary void has been identified in relation to mobilisations for jihadist groups in the Arab World (Mohamedou, 2018; Kundnani, 2014). The attraction to Al-Shabaab is a case in point, as Kundnani (2014) shows

For young Somalis in Minnesota angry at US foreign policy in the war on terror, and who want to give expression to their opposition, al-Shabaab seems to be the only show in town [...] apart from al-Shabaab, there were no political groups attempting to pick up on those opinions and give them an organized expression, offering alternative forms of political activism to al-Shabaab's violent fundamentalism.

(Kundani, 2014, p.227)

The revolutionary void plays a crucial role: If a powerful entity is seen to be doing something effective to fight the injustice and provide relief for the suffering of innocent human beings, grievances are unlikely to lead to violent actions, such as direct armed intervention via non-state actors. The response to grievances is, in a way, delegated to actors who have some degree of legitimacy. In contrast, if nobody is doing anything and the suffering of innocent human beings continues under the watch of the international community, non-state actors will have ample material to justify their need to intervene, regardless of their political agenda or ideological orientation.

At the core of responsabilisation lies the concept of *jusqu'au-boutisme*. It is an ideological construct that posits the need to step up to the plate to achieve authenticity. Because if all agree that injustice exists, it is the ones who are most authentic, who not only talk the talk, but walk the walk, who will effectively do something about it. The quest for *authenticity* is encapsulated in this idea of *jusqu'au-boutisme*, of going all in, of being real. *Jusqu'au-boutisme* can also be seen as the primary explanation for the veneration of martyrs and martyrdom, for these human beings gave all they had, including their lives, to the cause they were fighting for. The rationale of *jusqu'au-boutisme* must be understood as the real *slippery slope*: Once we adhere to the basic premise of a wrong or a cause, actually *doing* something about it becomes a matter of authenticity. On a logical and rhetorical level, this logic provides a strong impetus towards action. This understanding is fundamentally distinct from the psychological theory of the slippery slope proposed by McCauley and Moskaleiko (2011), which revolves around the fact that individuals do not resort immediately to extreme violence, but arrive at it through an incremental process, in which the individual steps seem harmless.

The need to step up to the plate, to fight against injustice, by any means necessary, is frequently associated with men, especially when it comes to armed action. The concept of combat masculinity (Sion, 2007) captures the set of values that is posited as being essential to manhood. *Real men* are not only courageous and brave, strong, and fearless; they are first and foremost authentic and sincere about their engagement. This perception of combat masculinity (with *jusqu'au-boutisme* at its core) is one of the main ideological constructs justifying and pushing for mobilisation, especially violent mobilisation. These findings present a slight departure from gendered studies on terrorism, which argue that engagement in terrorism can be seen as a reaction to humiliation and 'emasculatation', i.e., as an attempt to *restore* hegemonic masculinity (Ferber & Kimmel, 2008). Values associated with masculinity do not seem to be about restoring anything lost, but

about stepping up to the plate and bearing the hardships this entails. Thus, combat masculinity appears to be latently present in descriptions of the need to take responsibility, to defend and protect innocent civilians, in expressions of admiration for those who go *all in*, up to sacrificing their lives for a cause, and in the very attraction to combat and violence. The logics of *jusqu'au-boutisme* and combat masculinity can be used in different ways, among others also to disengage from violent groups and construct a prosocial and non-violent way of life. The fact that values associated with masculinity can support desistance processes has been identified before among juvenile offenders (Søgaard et al., 2016).

This book has not focused on the role of religion *per se*, but on the role that religiously inspired narratives can play in the way in which individuals engage with grievances. The goal was not to downplay the role of religion, as Dawson and Amarasingam (2017) lament regarding scholarship that focuses on structural factors, but to allow for a fresh engagement with religious concepts and narratives when it comes to violence, especially in the jihadist spectrum. This has allowed for concepts such as *jihad* or *shari'a* to be analysed based on the understanding of those who adhere to them and use them as a banner for their struggle. This allows for such concepts to be demystified and grasped in their sociological meaning, which is what ultimately informs mobilisation and action. Notably, the concept of *jihad*, which has been engaged with by Western terrorism scholars in a mostly superficial and romanticising manner, can and should be read in light of the concept of *jusqu'au-boutisme*. Outside theological debates, armed *jihad* is namely understood by those who adhere to it as a responsibility to protect and defend the oppressed and fight for justice. It resembles combat masculinity because this responsibility is seen as primarily incumbent upon men.

Crucially, the entire process of grievance-based engagement must be read and understood alongside a consideration of what can be called the *taste of radicality*. Fighting for justice with a group of rebellious underdogs is, as mentioned, an attractive image that corresponds to the values and imaginaries of heroes that are widespread across the world. The *taste of radicality* reassembles all the factors that stand somewhat in contrast to the rational grievance-based engagement: excitement, thrill-seeking, bravado, adventurism, escapism and, in fact, emotionality more generally. Most of these have been identified by the literature (Crettiez, 2016; Githens-Mazer, 2014; Katz, 1988; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Sageman, 2011). Undeniably, radicality, despite the hardships and difficulties it entails for the individuals involved, is exciting and fun, reminiscent of Roussinos' (2014) observation that 'the hidden awful truth about war is how much fun it is' (p.3). Grievances and politico-ideological motives can be instrumentalised to respond to this taste of radicality. The relationship between authentic and instrumentalised grievances is therefore complex, as is the tension between emotionality and rationality, within which engagement takes place. Grievance-based engagement cannot be pressed into either of these poles: Rather, individuals who see themselves as fighting for justice are constantly struggling (at their personal level but also within their group) to maintain a critical balance between emotionality and rationality, thrill-seeking and conviction, between

authentic engagement with grievances and their instrumentalisation. These fields of tension are essential to our understanding of politico-ideological mobilisation and violence.

An important finding that emerged from this book is the crucial role of contextual and situational factors in determining whether actual engagement takes place or not. There are, of course, sociological and psychological factors at the individual level that influence whether someone ends up engaging in grievances or not. However, apart from their extraordinary willingness to care relentlessly and to systematically resist apathy, individuals that act upon grievances up to the point of envisaging violence are in most ways very ordinary. The role of the environment the individual grows up in and the social constellation they find themselves in when grievances become salient and engagement is envisaged appears to play a much more important role. This is not a novel finding *per se*, as the importance of relational, contextual, situational, and temporal factors has been pointed out before (Bosi & Della Porta, 2012; Carlsson et al., 2019; Crettiez, 2016; Ducol, 2013; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Kruglanski et al., 2017; Malet, 2013; McAdam, 1986; McAdam et al., 2004; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Windisch et al., 2016). If this book contributes something in this respect, it is the importance of considering contextual factors specifically in relation to grievances. Whether individuals are confronted with specific collective memories or moral shocks, exposed to certain values and narratives or influenced by the role of particular political groups, depends almost exclusively on the environment in which they grow up. When exploring situational and contextual factors, it is therefore important to broaden the scope beyond aspects that are immediately linked to mobilisation and violence (e.g., how come this individual joined this group or committed this attack?) to cover the entire spectrum of grievance-based engagement. Related to this, the findings of this book point to the importance of structural factors and political dissatisfaction, in line with the argument that it is perhaps not as much the individual that ‘tips’ into radicality, but the context and situation that evolve to a degree that prompts mobilisation and violence (Ahmad & Monaghan, 2019; Lafaye, 2017; Liebling & Williams, 2018). Hence, overall, the importance of contextual factors in determining the outcome of a grievance-based mobilisation, including the turn to violent tactics and groups, cannot be understated.

Figure 16.4 is intended to summarise and illustrate the analysis of grievance-based engagement that has been presented here. At the centre of grievance-based engagement is an injustice that is identified, appropriated and sought to be addressed. The three social performances revolve around that injustice. The figure illustrates the most important concepts related to each social performance (e.g., moral shocks, rebellious underdogs) in rounded squares and associated subordinated concepts in elliptic shapes. Emotional states are presented in italics inside the grey areas attributed to the social performances. As explained, the entire process of engaging with injustices is accompanied and influenced by contextual and situational factors, as well as by an ongoing struggle with the taste of radicality and the three fields of tension that emerge from that struggle.




Figure 16.4 Integrated analysis of grievance-based engagement

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